More than three decades after apartheid ended, the relationship between the United States and South Africa has reached another low point. From accusing America’s close ally Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice to courting dictatorships opposed to Washington, the ANC has seemingly delighted in seeing how far it can antagonise the eagle before it claws back.
Last week, it did. On 2 November, Washington announced its intention to withdraw South Africa’s benefits under AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, from 1 January 2027. The decision threatens an important trading advantage and marks a serious rupture in bilateral relations.
It will not close the American market to South African exports. But losing preferential access is consequential enough. The ANC has treated American goodwill as though it existed independently of what we do and say. Our exporters are now discovering otherwise.
From Non Alignment to Open Hostility
To be sure, there is a fierce determination in this second Trump administration to make an example of South Africa. This plays well to a domestic political audience tired of Pretoria’s resistance to American interests. Washington’s stated concerns include trade and investment barriers, corruption and threats to its national security and foreign policy interests. The dispute is broader than the ANC’s position on Israel alone.
But Pretoria has given Washington ample reasons to question its priorities. Following the brief golden period under President Mandela, when bilateral cooperation and mutual support were the order of the day, the ANC’s selective approach to human rights has steadily undermined its claim to moral authority.
The rift has deepened as the party has courted Russia, Cuba and Iran. Its dealings with Hamas have been particularly controversial. The ANC’s own account of its December 2023 engagements acknowledges meetings with delegations that included Hamas. Calling such engagement solidarity does not make its diplomatic consequences disappear.
Long before Trump returned to office, South Africa’s relationship with Russia was causing friction. Joint naval exercises with Russia and China in February 2023 coincided with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That was a remarkable way to demonstrate supposedly neutral diplomacy.
The separate allegation that South Africa supplied weapons to Russia must remain qualified. Ramaphosa said the inquiry into the Lady R’s visit found no evidence that weapons were loaded for export to Russia. The allegation cannot be treated as a proven arms transfer. The wider problem, however, remains: Pretoria has repeatedly created doubts about what its non alignment actually means.
Moral Authority, Selectively Applied
Few issues have been more toxic to the relationship than the ANC’s fixation with Israel. Whatever one thinks of South Africa’s genocide case at the ICJ, the contrast with its own record on international justice is difficult to ignore.
In 2015, South Africa refused to arrest Sudanese President Omar al Bashir during his visit, despite outstanding ICC warrants. The court subsequently found that South Africa had failed to comply with its obligation to arrest and surrender him. The ANC cannot invoke international accountability with such conviction in one case while expecting its conduct in another to be forgotten.
The ICJ and ICC are different institutions. The principle at issue is consistent: a government claiming Mandela’s moral authority should expect scrutiny when its enthusiasm for justice changes according to the identity of the accused.
Iran offers another example of confused priorities. In August 2025, the head of the South African National Defence Force, General Rudzani Maphwanya, was reported as saying that South Africa and Iran shared “common goals”. DIRCO distanced itself from those remarks, saying they did not represent official foreign policy. That clarification was necessary. It also exposed a government struggling to explain what senior representatives of its own state were doing and saying abroad.
The ANC has combined the worst of interventionism with the worst of non alignment: energetic confrontation on selected issues, accompanied by indulgence towards governments whose abuses should make solidarity uncomfortable.
Ordinary South Africans Pay
And South Africa, not the ANC, pays the price. Trump’s executive order of 7 February 2025 directed agencies to halt assistance to South Africa, subject to exceptions. Alongside objections to domestic policies, it explicitly cited Pretoria’s positions on Israel and its relationship with Iran.
The subsequent damage to health services was substantial. UNAIDS reported that approximately 40 projects funded by USAID received termination letters in February 2025, disrupting clinics and HIV services. Those cuts were part of a broader American funding upheaval and cannot all be attributed to the ANC’s diplomacy. But they illustrate how exposed ordinary South Africans are when international relationships deteriorate.
The threatened loss of AGOA benefits adds another cost. Created in 2000, the programme provides preferential access to the American market. Its eligibility conditions cover governance, economic policy, human rights and American national security and foreign policy interests. Pretoria knew those conditions existed.
According to the South African government’s response to Washington’s announcement, exports under AGOA were worth approximately $4 billion in 2024 and $1.7 billion in 2025. Most South African exports to the United States already enter under ordinary trading terms, so losing AGOA would not end bilateral trade. The government is right to make that distinction.
But for an exporter competing on narrow margins, preferential access can help determine whether an order is won, an investment proceeds or jobs remain viable. Workers in exposed industries cannot pay their bills with statements of international solidarity.
While Trump and his supporters speak of America First, the ANC has invented its own diplomatic doctrine: South Africa Last. Our economic, trade and security interests come after ideological loyalties, historical grievances and the pursuit of moral applause.
The government says it has engaged constructively, offered concessions and defended South Africa’s sovereignty. Washington is not entitled to dictate every South African policy. But invoking sovereignty does not answer whether the ANC has exercised it wisely, or what South Africans have gained from the confrontations conducted in their name.
Put South Africa First
The test of a good foreign policy is the national interest, measured in the prosperity, security and wellbeing of ordinary South Africans. Does it create jobs? Does it remove trade barriers and open markets? Does it connect an economy that urgently needs growth with partners who can unlock investment and capital? Does it advance our diplomatic and strategic objectives?
A serious government would ask those questions before allowing a valuable relationship to reach this point. It would distinguish principled disagreement from unnecessary provocation and apply its professed concern for human rights consistently.
Pretoria must now use the notice period to pursue a workable settlement while helping affected industries prepare. Diversifying exports is sensible, but alternative markets cannot simply be summoned into existence to replace advantages we have allowed to slip away.
South Africa needs a foreign policy that serves its people. Too often, the ANC seems to expect its people to serve its foreign policy.
Adam Silberman
Adam Silberman is a South African lawyer and a graduate of Leiden University in The Hague, where he specialised in international relations, defence and government policy. He is the founder of Argentir, a consulting firm advising on legal, regulatory and geopolitical risk.
