Recognition Blocked by Politics
The question of Somaliland’s international recognition has long been entangled in the Horn of Africa’s complex historical, legal, and geopolitical landscape. Somaliland’s quest has never failed due to weak legal arguments; it has been deliberately blocked by political maneuvering designed to halt recognition before it became irreversible.
For over three decades, Somaliland has demonstrated the practical markers of statehood: effective governance, stability, elections, and functioning institutions. Yet recognition has repeatedly stalled because external actors, including Western powers, Turkey, and regional organizations, have treated it as a political problem to manage rather than a state to acknowledge.
Today, as global and regional powers jockey for influence along the Red Sea corridor, these dynamics have become more urgent. Past administrations offer critical lessons. During the Silanyo government (2012–2013) and the Muse Bihi Abdi era, Somaliland consistently faced proposals for dialogue under asymmetric conditions, negotiations structured to favor Mogadishu rather than respect Somaliland’s sovereignty.
In 2023, proposals emerged to restart stalled talks with Somalia. I cautioned in my Horn Diplomat op-ed, “Somaliland: The Consequences of Reviving and Resuming Stalled Talks with Somalia”, that engaging in dialogue under such conditions risked undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty and carefully cultivated path to recognition. Negotiations favoring Mogadishu, or responding to external pressure, serve less as neutral conflict-resolution mechanisms and more as instruments of containment, neutralizing Somaliland’s diplomatic leverage. The Muse Bihi administration heeded this warning and refrained from restarting the stalled talks, preserving Somaliland’s strategic position.
The Turkey Model
The relevance of these lessons became particularly evident in 2026, when Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland. While celebrated in some circles, this milestone alarmed others. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s former Foreign Minister during the Silanyo era, emphasized that Somaliland’s earlier failure to achieve recognition was not accidental. Rather, it was a deliberate diplomatic maneuver aimed at halting recognition before it could become irreversible.
Davutoğlu framed Israel’s recognition not as an isolated act but as a strategic move within a broader geopolitical calculus. He recalled that in 2012–2013, when Western countries attempted to divide Somalia by recognizing Somaliland, Turkey intervened decisively. Direct talks in Ankara between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo produced a joint declaration and a tripartite Somalia–Somaliland–Turkey framework. This approach effectively blocked recognition, reopened political channels, restored dialogue, and projected Somali unity as a viable diplomatic model.
From Turkey’s perspective, recognition could only succeed or fail depending on timing, initiative, and political context, not simply legal arguments. Turkey embedded the issue within African Union norms, mobilized support through the OIC and Arab League, and raised the diplomatic costs of unilateral recognition. Once dialogue is reintroduced under external influence, momentum for recognition could dissipate entirely. Davutoğlu publicly outlined these recommendations in a detailed thread on X (formerly Twitter).
Why the Old Model Fails Today
The world of 2026 is not the world of 2012. The so-called “Turkey hyper-kracy” approach - relying on external pressure, mediation, and proxy influence - assumed Somaliland would be a reactive actor. That assumption no longer holds. Somaliland has matured into a globally recognized actor in practice, if not yet legally. It governs effectively, maintains stability, and has cultivated strategic partnerships extending far beyond Ankara’s sphere of influence.
Current proposals to involve Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional actors are largely ineffective and misaligned with Somaliland’s interests. Somaliland has carefully analyzed which actors are reliable partners. Israel, Ethiopia, the UAE, the U.S., and the U.K. are genuine supporters of its independence. Any strategy assuming other countries will act solely in Somaliland’s favor risks undermining its sovereignty.
Davutoğlu’s recommendation to engage the so-called Northeastern State federal government is fundamentally misplaced. No such entity exists within Somaliland’s political framework. Attempting contact would only legitimize internal destabilization and risk importing a proxy conflict. It is evident that neither Davutoğlu nor Turkey fully grasps Somaliland’s historical, political, or territorial reality. The “Turkey model” of 2012–2013 failed precisely because it ignored Somaliland’s colonial borders and the will of its people. Today, Turkish representatives and self-styled ambassadors appear to be repeating the same errors, attempting to manipulate non-existent actors but Somalilanders are fully aware. Any attempt to bypass its actual leadership will fail once again.
The parallel between the Silanyo era and the Muse Bihi period is clear: external pressures repeatedly try to draw Somaliland into negotiations under conditions favoring Mogadishu. Dialogue under such asymmetry does not resolve conflict; it constrains Somaliland, erodes legal leverage, and undermines independence. Repeating outdated frameworks will weaken Somaliland rather than strengthen it.
Turkey’s current objections, including its opposition to Israel–Somaliland engagement, are motivated not by principle but by strategic self-interest. An actively engaged Somaliland can form independent trade, security alliances, and diplomatic partnerships, potentially reducing Ankara’s leverage in the Horn of Africa. Appeals to Somali unity or Islamic solidarity function more as justifications for strategic entrenchment than as genuine normative principles.
The Path Forward
For Somaliland, the path forward is clear. Recognition will come through proactive, strategic, and independent diplomacy, leveraging trusted partners, preserving sovereignty, and learning from past failures. Dialogue or mediation under asymmetric conditions, foreign-driven frameworks, and attempts to manipulate proxy actors only risk undermining decades of state-building and delaying international acknowledgment.
Somaliland does not need managed dialogue under external influence. It needs continued state-building, strategic partnerships, and calculated diplomacy with actors that treat it as a peer rather than a problem. Recognition will come from leverage, clarity of purpose, and the quiet confidence of a state that already functions as one.
Gulaid Yusuf Idaan
Senior Lecturer | Researcher
