I expected to spend two hours discussing terrorism. Instead, one of Britain's best-known counter-extremism experts argued that the real battle has already moved into politics.
Stefan Tompson
Aug 3, 2026 - 12:39 PM
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When I travelled to London to interview British-Egyptian counter-extremism expert Khaled Hassan, I expected to spend most of our conversation discussing terrorism. Instead, we spent remarkably little time talking about bombs or attacks. Almost everything came back to politics.
For more than two decades Britain has approached Islamism primarily as a security problem. Every attack produces the same questions. Was MI5 watching the suspect? Did Prevent fail? Could the police have intervened sooner?
Khaled Hassan believes Britain is asking the wrong questions.
He described the country's condition as "life-threatening," not because of any single terrorist organisation, but because he believes Islamist ideas have increasingly moved from the margins of society into politics, public institutions and community leadership. In his view, terrorism is no longer the beginning of the discussion. It is the end of a much longer process.
One of the first subjects we discussed was Britain's counter-extremism strategy. Hassan argued that institutions have become increasingly reluctant to confront Islamist ideology directly. Referring to the government's Prevent programme, he claimed that parts of the system have shifted towards reinterpreting concepts associated with jihad rather than confronting extremist ideas head-on. Whether readers agree with that criticism or not, it reflects a broader concern that ran throughout our conversation: Britain has become more comfortable discussing the language surrounding extremism than the ideology itself.
The discussion quickly turned to scale. Hassan pointed to the roughly 50,000 individuals actively monitored by Britain's security services, while arguing that the broader challenge extends well beyond those under investigation. Referring to a recent Policy Exchange survey, he cited findings that approximately 16% of British Muslims expressed support for ISIS. He also argued that support for other Islamist organisations or illiberal positions may be considerably higher. Those figures are politically contentious and deserve careful scrutiny, but they illustrate the central point he was making throughout the interview: the debate should not be confined to terrorism alone.
Hassan believes Britain has become reactive. Terrorist attacks receive enormous attention, but the longer-term political and ideological developments that precede them receive far less. In his view, governments have become highly effective at pursuing individuals who commit acts of violence while paying insufficient attention to the ideas and organisations that shape public attitudes long before violence occurs.
As our conversation continued, it became increasingly clear that Hassan sees Britain's challenge as fundamentally political rather than simply security-related.
He argued that organised Islamist activism should not be understood solely through the lens of terrorism. Instead, he believes influence increasingly operates through voting blocs, community organisations and democratic institutions. Most Muslims, he stressed, are not consciously participating in any organised political project. However, he argued that organised activists often exercise influence far beyond their own numbers by presenting themselves as representatives of wider Muslim communities.
That led naturally into one of the interview's most controversial subjects: what Hassan described as a growing alliance between sections of the political left and Islamist activists. He argued that some politicians see electoral advantage in cultivating these relationships, while parts of academia, the media and activist organisations have become increasingly reluctant to distinguish between criticism of Islamism and hostility towards Muslims. According to Hassan, this has created a political environment in which difficult conversations are frequently avoided rather than confronted.
Demographics also formed a significant part of our discussion. Hassan argued that political influence inevitably follows demographic change as communities seek greater representation and political power. He believes Britain is already experiencing that process in parts of the country, pointing to debates about local identity, political representation and the emergence of explicitly faith-based political mobilisation. Whether readers accept those conclusions or not, it is clear that questions of immigration, integration and representation have become increasingly central to British politics.
Perhaps Hassan's sharpest criticism, however, was directed not at Islamist organisations but at Britain's political class itself.
He argued that politicians increasingly think in electoral cycles rather than generations. In his view, long-term questions concerning immigration, integration, demographics and national identity are routinely postponed because they are politically uncomfortable in the present. Governments, he suggested, are rewarded for avoiding these debates rather than confronting them honestly.
The final part of our conversation focused not on diagnosis but on solutions.
Hassan argued that liberal democracies cannot survive if they lose the confidence to defend themselves. He advocated stronger legal measures against individuals who openly support extremist organisations, argued that democracies should establish clearer boundaries against movements seeking to undermine liberal institutions, and rejected the idea that democratic societies are obliged to tolerate every political movement regardless of its objectives. In his view, a democracy without the ability to defend its own values eventually ceases to be a democracy at all.
Readers will disagree with many of Hassan's conclusions. Some will challenge his analysis of British politics. Others will dispute his assessment of demographic change, political alliances or the appropriate response to extremism. They should. These are precisely the kinds of questions democracies are supposed to debate. What struck me most about our conversation was not any single statistic or prediction. It was that almost every answer eventually returned to the same point.
Britain's Islamist debate has changed. For years, it centred on terrorism. Khaled Hassan believes the more important questions now concern politics, institutions and whether liberal democracies remain willing, and able, to defend the principles upon which they are built.
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Stefan Tompson
Founder | Visegrad24